CEPR

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Oct 01, 2015

Palestinian Reconciliation

Why it matters

The split between between Palestinian political factions is not the central reason for instability in the Middle East and the continuation of the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. But with Israel's rejection of peace in favour of expansion in the West Bank, siege on Gaza and the rejection of the right of return of millions of refugees, it matters.

That Israeli policy is the primary cause of instability is unlikely to change without the exertion of significant external pressure. With no signs of this happening, reconciliation is perhaps the most immediately pressing and achievable breakthrough that can be realised. The result of such a breakthrough would be a significant boost to the chances of Palestinian self-determination.

This year, with Palestinian Authority (PA) credibility at an all-time low the 'Palestine Papers' released by al-Jazeera sunk the PA's reputation to new depths. While the PA's popular credibility is severely lacking, it retains the financial and political friendship (albeit an unequal friendship) of the United States, Europe and Israel.

Besieged in Gaza, Hamas has the converse problem: relatively high levels of credibility among the Palestinian people, but lacking support among key international actors.

After Hamas won the 2006 election, and after a short interlude of unity government, Fatah (the dominant party in the PA) joined forces with Israel and the United States to attempt to overthrow Hamas by force. When Hamas pre-empted the coup by taking over the Gaza Strip's security apparatus, a bitter conflict ensued that resulted in Hamas controlling Gaza and Fatah using its Western-trained security forces to control the West Bank .[1]

Incentivised by Israel and the US, the PA has clamped down on Hamas members in the West Bank. Imprisonment and torture have been commonplace, provoking reprisals in Gaza.

The Palestinians have attempted reconciliation, but it has proved to be a protracted process. Israel is let off the hook by the split, as it does not have to consider a strong, unified Palestinian response to its settlement building and other illegal policies. As British shadow Justice Minister Andy Slaughter put it "the Palestinians hold such a weak hand that it's difficult to see how the game can be played. Perhaps someone can lend them some chips".

With its weak hand the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Liberation Organisation has been frustrated in peace talks, with Israel feeling able to reject the Abbas team's unprecedented offers of concessions.

Without reconciliation President Abbas is unable to speak with authority about many key issues, and Israel perceives that there is more to be gained by maintaining a rejectionist stance.

Similarly, Prime Minister Haniyeh in Gaza cannot claim to speak for the Palestinian people. Like Abbas, his democratic mandate has expired.

Palestinian reconciliation would be a significant boost to hopes for peace, giving the Palestinians a stronger bargaining position and greater regional and international political credibility.

Key issues need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Can the prevailing Fatah position that the West Bank's security forces be deployed for suppressing resistance continue?

The Abbas regime have offered to make changes to the security forces in Gaza, but are unwilling to make changes to the 100,000-strong West Bank security force as this will meet with disapproval from Western funders.

And what of the Quartet? They demand that the Palestinians recognise Israel's "right to exist", end violence and respect previous agreements. But what would the Palestinians receive in return? Many argue that the international community, if it is serious about regional peace based around two viable states, should force Israel to recognise Palestine's right to exist, cease its violence against defenceless civilians and act in accordance with international law.

While Fatah are willing to accede to the Quartet's demands, Hamas retain a more independent position.

Uprisings across the region have sparked a dramatic shift in Abbas's position and he responded enthusiastically to Haniyeh's suggestion that he visit Gaza.

But Palestinians will remain sceptical about Abbas, believing it is only because he has run out of friends that he has turned to Gaza. Abbas angered the United States by insisting that the resolution on illegal Jewish settlements be put before the UN Security Council. Israel and the US have humiliated Abbas in peace talks, where he has achieved nothing. Abbas allies Jordan and Saudi Arabia are distracted by internal dissent, while his key ally Hosni Mubarak has departed the scene.

Overtures to Hamas will anger the US and Israel further. When faced with a choice, will Abbas reconcile with Hamas or stick with the US and Israel? US-Israeli policy shows no sign of changing, so Abbas and the Palestinians should expect strenuous Obama-Natenyahu efforts to sabotage reconciliation.

Egypt has so far been the mediator of reconciliation talks, but this position is less ensured now, with the fall of President Mubarak. Under Mubarak Egypt had an interest in maintaining the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. Now, if Egypt continues to play the role of mediator, the country's next government, democratically elected, is unlikely to favour maintenance of the dire status quo.

Reconciliation would:

  • Shift the focus of all parties away from internal rivalries and towards ending the occupation
  • Increase the likelihood of democratic elections to form a representative government
  • Strengthen the Palestinian position at future peace talks with Israel
  • Policy makers across the region have stressed the importance of reconciliation to CEPR delegations. Reconciliation would enable Arab governments to give backing to representatives of the Palestinians and develop a stronger pan-Arab movement for peace.

by Tom Charles


[1] The factual record of the attempted coup and subsequent counter-coup is written by David Rose for Vanity Fair. It makes extensive use of US State Department documents. http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804?currentPage=all

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